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Abstract 
Personalized security in E-banking is an important issue for many individuals and companies that are looking for 
achieving the proper level of security. The cloud environment is a suitable infrastructure to implement personalized 
security mechanisms for many big companies such as banks. Employing mandatory access controls boosts the 
security of E-banking to a high level. Flask architecture is the security architecture which enforces mandatory access 
control that provides a clean separation of security policies and enforcements. In this paper, it a model for 
implementing personalized security in E-banking over a cloud environment is introduced. Using role-based access 
control models, the security system can be configured to provide expected level of security in e-payment systems 
employing user-defined policies for individuals, companies and governmental organizations. The paper focuses on 
defining such policies and how they improve the level of security. 
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1. Introduction 
Since financial systems are one of the main paramount goals for hackers, security has been an eminent 
issue in these systems. The increase in the number of financial institutes that use computational internet-
based services requires them to apply more complicated and advanced security schemes to cope with 
threats and frauds vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, any failure to meet the security requirements in such 
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systems may lead to a critical disaster for these institutes. The effective security requirements are an 
abstract idea that would not be easily achievable. Many solutions have been proposed to reduce the risk of 
fraud and to provide the better immunity over online transactions such as e-banking operations. However, 
none of those has had an effective means of addressing issues thoroughly. In this paper, some of the well-
known existing approaches together with their advantages and shortcomings are discussed, and a novel 
personalized security system is proposed to provide a safe environment for E-banking transactions over 
cloud environments. The safe environment is provided by enforcing some policy related to individuals, 
companies, and governmental institutions. 
The Flask architecture introduced by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
reinforced mandatory access and concurrency control to meet the high-speed e-banking transactions 
processing requirements. Flask introduces essential requirements for personal safety. The paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related work on implementing Flask architecture and cloud 
applications in E-banking. The proposed personalized security mechanism is discussed in Section 3. In 
this Section, a model and all related policies to implement the personalized security in E-Banking over 
cloud computing is presented. Section 4 investigates the performance of the proposed mechanism, and 
Section 5 draws the conclusion. 
2. Related Work 
Design and implementation of Flask architecture in distributed systems such as cloud has been 
discussed in [1] and [2]. The geographical dispersal of information, the improved reliability of multiple 
computer systems, and the possibility of concurrent execution of applications are important reasons of 
Flask implementation. The implemented methods in [1] that are usually used to improve the security 
performance makes it difficult to access or even compare the models and often requires expensive 
reconstruction costs. Concurrent execution of applications is a very important factor in E-banking 
systems, since the goal is to reduce transaction processing and report generating times. The solution 
proposed in this paper adopts the distributed security infrastructure presented in [2] with a selective 
mechanism for remote authentication based on process types to limit the overhead of some specific 
processes. 
There are some special features that Flask benefits from, such as building and comparing of distributed 
and concurrent models, having a generic layered architecture, and having sufficient flexibility to support 
multiple models. Flask architecture runs different concurrent control schemes over persistent data [1]. 
Moreover, it has the flexibility to support different models of concurrency, such as atomic [3], and nested 
transactions [4] over the same data. In addition, it consists of a recovery mechanism that can be set up to 
suit persistent applications [3]. Flask architecture includes primary elements for object managers [5] while 
allowing users to customize the level of security by enabling or disabling modules during transaction 
runtimes [6]. In this paper, not only the implementation of Flask architecture in a cloud environment is 
discussed, but also, to decrease credit card frauds, the implementation of the personalized security in E-
banking is introduced. 
Banking systems play an eminent role in developing of global knowledge-based economies these days. 
Numerous advantages of applying information technology on banking solutions are to enable financial 
institutes to easily adapt to the market constraints and remain on top in providing favourite services for 
clients. Cloud environment is one of the newest informational technologies to provide such infrastructures 
and capabilities [7]. Although employing cloud has enormous benefits [8], security issues such as security 
in general and security in database should be taken into account. Cloud has four models of deployments. 
One of the best one that fits better in e-banking for sensitive, non-shared data is private cloud [9]. Cloud 
has the capacity to change completely the financial service prospects. Enterprise banking systems using 
related technologies give accessibility anyone, anywhere to benefit from modern core banking solutions 
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without high cost and other difficulties of the newly established knowledge [10]. Service level agreements 
(SLAs) define security and customer’s information constraints compliances over cloud. In addition, 
cloud-based solutions fully comply with the minimum compliance standards and are acceptable to the risk 
and security officers [11]. 
3. Personalized Security Mechanism 
3.1 Proposed Solution 
This paper concentrates on the user security. That is, security matters considered in a private financial 
institute is totally different than an individual with a small amount of bank deposit. These two must be 
evaluated from different aspects and separate ways. As the rules are to be applied to different types of 
accounts, security policies can also be different. For instance, a large private company with large revenue 
should provide maximum security for the accounts by using group signatures on cheques. Security can be 
defined for an account or a card. To enhance the security of cards, the following means of card security 
should be considered: i) a card should work with certain devices under any circumstances. For instance, 
cards only should be active through internet banking and transactions should be via the IP range of the 
company; ii) some accounts require having a phone number to call and a text message confirmation. If the 
confirmation is not received within a certain period of time, the transaction will be cancelled; iii) 
transactions must be acknowledged by a fax or an e-mail. Otherwise, after a certain period of time, the 
reversal transaction is generated by the system and the first transaction will be cancelled; iv) transaction 
tracking codes will be sent through a channel. One or more phone numbers can be used to confirm the 
transactions. Based on these considerations, in the next section a security solution for card transactions is 
proposed in which Flask architecture is adopted as the existing architecture to control user access and 
enhance the security over cloud environment. 
3.2 Personalized security Policy Definitions 
This section defines registering, employing, modifying and deleting personalized security policies. For 
this purpose, a server (or servers in order to load balance and fault tolerance) is allocated to apply the 
conditions on personalized security policies. The server is also responsible for sending and receiving SMS 
confirmations and sending reversal transactions to credit cards. Individuals and company agents that use 
this method are authenticated after filling up related forms at bank branches. An application can be used 
to translate hard-copy requests to the policies, which is issued by personal security servers. For instance, 
if confirmation is done via SMS or Email by a single person, the policy is created as follows: 
Allow {Cell_number | Email} {PAN | Account_no} expired_time(min) [CardPresent | CardNotPresent]
Allow +989xxxxxxxxx 603799xxxxxxxxxx 5 
Where Allow refers to the listed phone numbers or emails valid to send confirmation messages. The 
policy identifies that for a certain card or account number, an SMS confirmation from phone or an Email 
should come until a timer times out. CardPresent | CardNotPresent is optional and refers to transactions 
in which cards are physically present, such as using a point of sales (POS) to do a transaction compared to 
transactions that does not require physical cards such as Internet e-payments. All transactions will be 
considered if this option is not used. SMS can contain one of the following options: y as yes and n as no 
to switch to Email solution in which user can click the sent link to confirm the transaction. 
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Figure 1: Overview of proposed schema 
The following policy is a group signature policy by which a group of people acknowledge together, and if 
one of them refuses to confirm, the transaction must be failed. This policy is so useful for companies to be 
operated by several accountants in an accounting department. In this case, confirmation of director of 
accounting department and one of the accountants is enough to approve the transaction. In the following 
policies, SMS confirmations are sent to the entire list (i.e. {or {Cell_number | Email}}*) and are 
approved if one is confirmed. 
Allow {Cell_number | Email} {{or | and} {Cell_number | Email}}* {PAN | Account_no} expired_time(min) 
[CardPresent | CardNotPresent] 
Cell number of director of accounting department AND  
(Cell numbers of accountant OR Cell numbers of accountant OR …) 
Allow {Cell_number | Email} and {{Cell_number | Email} {or {Cell_number | Email}}* {PAN | 
Account_no} expired_time(min) [CardPresent | CardNotPresent] 
Another type of policy defined below identifies that if the source of transactions made by certain primary 
account numbers (PANs) is in the range of local IP addresses, transactions are valid. This policy is well 
defined for internet banking and online shopping applications, and is a suitable solution when a static IP 
address is used. 
Allow IP_Range {PAN | Account_no} 
The following policy applies restrictions on devices to let certain cards make transactions. For instance, a 
card may only make transactions via point of sales, information kiosks (InfoKiosks), and automatic teller 
machines (ATMs). In General form we can restrict the use of card only in devices that need to card 
presents and vice versa. In order to restrict one of the devices, Disallow command may be used. 
Allow {CardPresent | CardNotPresent} {PAN | Account_no} 
Allow{POS [and ATM [and InfoKiosk [and internet [and Telephone [and mobile]]]]]} {PAN | Account_no} 
Disallow {POS | ATM | InfoKiosk| internet | Telephone | mobile}{PAN | Account_no} 
The following policy is the most commonly used policy by those who are not willing to use teller 
machines or mobile banking transactions. These policies are installed on authorized machines and check 
any kind of transactions. 
TransactionCheckingMethod () 
{ 
If (Transaction.Type = 200 and Tranaction.ResponceCode = 0) // a successful purchase 
 { 
  If (Defined any personalized security rule) Then 
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  { 
   SendSMS(Users, “If you do the TransactionNoxxxxxx., Please confirm it” ); 
SendSMS(Merchant, “TransactionNoxxxxxx might be cancel, please consider this 
issue” ); 
   If (Receive SMS from users and satisfy the rule’s conditions) 
   Then SendSMS(Merchant , “Successful purchase for TransactionNoxxxxxx”);  
Else SendSMS(Merchant, “The TransactionNoxxxxxx failed.”); 
} 




If (Defined warning rule) 
Then SendSMS(Users, “TransactionNoxxxxxx unsuccessful”) 
} 
} 
The policy is implemented if a purchase process is done successfully or any kind of notifications such 
as “insufficient fund” is not received. If the purchase is unsuccessful and the client still requests the 
transaction, an SMS is sent regarding the transaction. The policy is defined as fraud detection. 
Warning {Cell_number | Email} {{or | and} {Cell_number | Email}}* {PAN | Account_no} 
In a successful transaction, if the personalized security policy is applied to a PAN, SMSs are sent to 
seller(s) and client(s). After receiving the SMS, the seller finds out that the transaction might not be 
confirmed, and it might be cancelled. In this case, the seller can refuse delivering the goods before 
receiving the transaction confirmation SMS. If the policy is successful, a transaction confirmation SMS is 
sent to the seller and the entire process is ended up successfully. If a transaction is cancelled, the system 
generates a reverse transaction notification and sends it to the switch banking. That is, the money is sent 
back to the client’s account. The way the policy changes are applied is the same as the policy registration 
process. After the client and the representative of a company are authenticated by the bank, they can 
define, change, or delete a new policy. All policies are removed from the system after they are cancelled. 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2: Flowcharts for (a) registration in personalized security system (b) placing transactions 
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4. Performance Analysis  
The proposed solution to improve security in banking transactions has the following considerations: i) 
although the expired_time improves the operation of the proposed mechanism, the merchant must wait to 
receive the SMS confirmation before delivering the goods to customers; ii) the method proposed in this 
paper decreases fraud by transaction confirmation; iii) it may increase the cost of a transaction, since for a 
transaction, the personalized security server sends at least three SMSs and in group policies, the number 
of SMSs may increase; iv) the cost may decrease by using Email rather than SMS; v) another solution to 
decrease the cost is to define a threshold for transaction limits. For example, if the amount is greater than 
100$, the proposed mechanism sends SMS or Email to confirm the transaction. 
Fraudulent transactions in e-commerce have a huge growth from 2.7 billion dollars in 2010 to 
approximately 3.5 billion dollars in 2012 [12]. Companies reported an average loss of 0.9% of total online 
revenue as fraud in 2012 [13]. According to the report, fraud rate has increased from 0.6% in 2011 to 
0.8% in 2012 and average ticket value for a fraudulent order was $200 higher than a valid order ($149) 
[13]. 
If transactions are confirmed by SMS or email, the fraud rate can be reduced by the number of users 
that register and use the system. For simulation purposes, it is assumed that the statistical population to be 
105, the number of purchase transactions per year for everyone 102, one fraudulent transaction per 104 
transactions, the number of people using the proposed method 5000 and more, and the policy 
effectiveness ranging from 50% to 80%. The policy effectiveness is defined as the percentage of frauds 
that are prevented over total transactions. As Figure 3 (a) and (b) show, the number of frauds decreases 




Figure 3: Personalized security system with : (a) 50% effectiveness; (b) 80% effectiveness 
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5. Conclusion 
The paper has introduced a personalized security method in which E-banking transactions are secured 
against fraud. This paper has presented a method which employs Flask architecture in cloud environments 
to more effectively avoid fraudulent transactions. To achieve this goal, the policies and algorithms have 
been proposed to meet different organizations requirements for fraud detection. The performance analysis 
has shown that the risk of fraud has reduced. 
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